Background
An estimated 10,000 North Koreans live in Russia. As one of the three border countries to North Korea along with China and South Korea, Russia’s refugee policies have never been sympathetic to North Koreans. Alec Luhn of ForeignPolicy.com reported in 2017 that according to the Civic Assistance human rights group in Russia, only two North Korean applicants out of 211 were granted refugee status in Russia between 2004 and 2014, while 90 out of 170 applicants were granted temporary refugee status, which lasts for only a year. The situation for North Korean refugees became even more challenging when Russia and North Korea signed an agreement in 2014 to repatriate citizens living illegally in each other’s countries (the “2014 Deportation Agreement”).
North Korean refugees in Russia can be divided into two groups: those who enter Russia legally as laborers and escape from their work sites located in the country’s far east, and those who illegally cross the border. The first group is perhaps the most popular form of escape. There is a history of escapes by North Korean laborers due to the extremely harsh living conditions at the North Korean-controlled logging camps. Under the circumstances, most escapees attempt to work in farms or factories owned by Russians in return for shelter or minimal wage. However, since they are often left homeless and vulnerable to exploitation and risk of deportation, escapees are likely to find themselves with no choice but to commit theft in order to survive the bitter winters. This has understandably caused antipathy among the local communities towards North Korean refugees, which in turn makes their lives more difficult as illegal aliens in society.
Why China and Not Russia?
Between North Korea’s two neighboring countries, there are five main reasons why North Koreans might choose to defect to China and not Russia.
First, as northeastern China is home to the largest population of ethnic Koreans living outside of the Korean Peninsula, North Korean refugees easily blend in and can hide among the Chinese as they journey along the underground network to freedom. As compared to hiding in Russia, the culturally diverse environment in China further allows North Korean refugees to communicate with and seek help from ethnic Koreans, often passing off as Korean-speaking Chinese without immediately raising suspicion.
Second, stemming from the reason above, China has a much more established underground network comprising experienced brokers and Christian missionary groups than Russia. Although it is never safe to remain in the bordering towns due to constant inspections undertaken by the Chinese authorities, North Korean refugees also have a chance to earn money while living in China and might find work at one of the many Korean restaurants and companies operated by ethnic Koreans or South Koreans who are sympathetic towards the refugees.
Third, North Korea shares a 839 mile (1,350 km) border with China, which increases the chances for refugees to successfully cross without detection, compared to the mere 11 mile (18 km) heavily-patrolled border with Russia. In particular, some parts of the Yalu river dividing North Korean and China’s border city, Dandong, are narrow and relatively easier to crawl over in the winter when the river freezes or to swim across in the summer.
Fourth, due to the relatively less-guarded border between China and North Korea compared to that between Russia and North Korea, it is much easier for North Korean refugees to return home with food and money, especially if their family remains in North Korea. There is a long history where North Korean refugees wandered back and forth between China and Korea since 1865 when Koreans were allowed to live and farm in Machuria during the Qing Dynasty, and it has been reported that in some circumstances, refugees who surrender themselves to Korean border guards claiming to have crossed the border to China for business purposes may simply pay a bribe and go unpunished.
Finally, compared to China’s climate which is similar to that in North Korea, it is much more difficult for refugees who are on the run to survive the harsh weather conditions and long Siberian winters in Russia without shelter.
Friendly Ties Between North Korea and Russia
Although Russia has ratified a number of international law treaties which are favourable to the protection of refugees, the signing of the 2014 Deportation Agreement controversially undermines the same. To date, the Russian government has not yet clarified its legal and political stance.
For instance, although Russia is a signatory to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and recognises the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, the 2017 Choe Myong Bok case sparked much public debate and remains largely controversial to this day. Choe legally arrived in Russia in 1999 to work as part of a group of labourers in a logging camp run by North Korean authorities. He has since lived in Russia with his partner and their two young children without legal documents after escaping from the camp in 2002. Choe was arrested in 2017 and received a deportation order from the Vsevolozhsky District Court. Despite a ruling from the European Court of Human Rights ordering Russia not to deport Choe back to North Korea where he is likely to face torture or even death, his fate remains uncertain due to 2014 Deportation Agreement. It should be noted that Choe was not the first North Korean refugee who had been caught in Russia. A fellow refugee, Ryu En Nam, was forcibly repatriated back to North Korea in 2008 and tortured to death by being roped to the back of a moving train.
After almost entirely dissipating in the 90’s, Russia and North Korea’s political and economic relationships have greatly improved. In the spring of 2014 Russia made moves to strengthen its ties with North Korea, including signing an economic agreement to raise bilateral trade from $112 million to $1 billion by 2020 and investing $340 million in a joint venture to build a railway stretching between the two countries. North Korean labor is extremely cheap and it is to Russia’s benefit that North Korea’s options are limited. Russia is expected to strictly comply with the 2014 Deportation Agreement and avoid the risk of becoming a new destination for North Koreans refugees.
Learn more about which countries North Korean defectors flee to in this article.
